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LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS FOR TORTS OF AGENTS:
A COMPARATIVE VIEW
Michael Conant*
The primary purpose of this study is to review the trends of
the law in England and in the United States concerning the vicar-
ious liability of principals for torts of their agents. Hence, we here
exclude from consideration the obvious liability of a principal for
all torts which he directs or authorizes his agent to commit.1 Such
liability can be found directly in the law of torts, which would hold
the principal liable as a party, and need not be based on agency.
All other torts of agents, the overwhelming majority of those which
occur, are committed without the principal's consent. Since all
representative authority in an agent, being a power on contract,
is based on consent of the principal, none of these torts can be
within the agent's actual or apparent authority.2 For this reason,
the concept "scope of authority," the measure of the principal's
liability for the agent's contracts, is totally inapplicable to test the
principal's vicarious liability in tort.3
The foundation of liability of employers for torts of employees
is stated in the general maxim of respondeat superior, which origi-
nated in the law of master and servant. Society imposes vicarious
liability on the employer because his selection and direction has
put the employee in the situation where the wrong occurs and
because he is the enterpriser who has assumed the risks of gain or
loss from the employee's work activities.4 It is perhaps this common
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of Chicago; Ph.D., 1949, University of Chicago; J.D., 1951, University
of Chicago. Member of Illinois Bar Association. Professor of Business
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1 Herring v. Hoppock, 15 N.Y. 409 (1857); Schuster v. McKellar, 7 El.
& B1. 705, 119 Eng. Rep. 1407 (1857); Glynn v. Houston, 2 Man. & G.
337, 133 Eng. Rep. 775 (1841); Robison v. Vaughton, 8 Car. & P. 252,
173 Eng. Rep. 482 (1838); See 2 F. MECHEm, LAW OF AGENCY 1457
(2d ed. 1914) for additional citations.
2 See Conant, Objective Theory of Agency: Apparent Authority and
the Estoppel of Apparent Ownership (to be published).
S Janeczko v. Manheimer, 77 F.2d 205, 207 (7th Cir. 1935); Johnson v.
Monson, 183 Cal. 149, 190 P. 635 (1920); Graham v. McCord, 384 S.W.
2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Dyer v. Munday, [1895] 1 Q.B. 742, 746;
Smith v. Martin, [1911] 2 K.B. 775, 782; Higgins v. Watervliet Turnpike
Co., 46 N.Y. 23, 26-27 (Ct. App. 1871). Note the confusion of Professor
Powell, who defines authority as based on consent and then writes
of unauthorized torts as being within the agent's usual authority.
R. POWELL, LAW OF AGENCY 6, 189 (2d ed. 1961).
4 Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 220 (1909); Laurie v.
Mueller, 248 Minn. 1, 3, 78 N.W.2d 434, 437 (1956). See BATY, VICAR-
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foundation of liability that causes great judges to confuse the terms
servant and agent and in many cases use them interchangeably. 5
But the tort liabilities of masters and principals are not identical
in all cases. The separate but overlapping rules for tort liability
in the master-servant relationship and the principal-agent relation-
ship require a preliminary digression into the definitions of servant
and agent. The main sections divide the principal's liability for
torts other than fraud from the special rules relating to misrepre-
sentation.
I. DEFINITIONS OF SERVANT AND AGENT
Since the law of master and servant began first, it is not sur-
prising that the early authorities spoke of agents as a special class
of servants.6 But in the ninteenth century, the terms servant and
agent developed separate meanings,7 and in some instances the
tort liabilities of their employers were held to differ. This distinc-
tion in meaning did not prevent a single employee from being
assigned some tasks as a servant and others as an agent. In the
twentieth century, however, the committee for the Restatement
(second) of Agency decided to go even further. In section 2, they
define servants as a subclass of agents." Later in the same volume,
however, they define servant independently and not as a subclass
of agents.9
ious LiAUTY 33-34 (1916); W. SEAVEY, Speculations as to "Respondeat
Superior", in STUDiEs iN AGENCY 129 (1949); Douglas, Vicarious Liabil-
ity and the Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584, 720 (1929); Laski,
The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105 (1916); Williams,
Vicarious Liability: Tort of the Master or of the Servant? 72 LAw Q.
REv. 522 (1956).
5 Devlin, J., in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services, Ltd., [1953)
1 All E.R. 711, 712; Denning L. J., in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Serv-
ices, Ltd., [1953] 2 All E.R. 753, 754-55; du Parcq, L. J., in Hewitt v.
Bonvin, [1940] 1 K.B. 188, 194-97. See Simpson v. Townsley, 283 F.2d
743, 746 (10th Cir. 1960); Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792, 795, 69 P.2d
136, 139 (1937); Kourik v. English, 340 Mo. 367, 371, 100 S.W. 2d 901,
905 (1936); Conard, What's Wrong With Agency? 1 J. LEGAL ED. 540,
553 (1949).
6 BLACKSTONE, COammENTARmS 427; 0. W. HOLMES, JR., TiE COMMON
LAW 228 (1881); 1 F. MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY 5 (2d ed. 1914).
7 Chicago & Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, 390(1884); Merriman Co. v. Thomas & Co., 103 Va. 24, 48 S.E. 490 (1904);
Barnett v. South London Tramways Co., 18 Q.B.D. 815 (1887).
8 "A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in
his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service
is controlled or is subject to the right of control by the master."
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 2 § 2 (2) (1957).
9 "A servant is a person employed to perform service in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the perform-
ance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control."
Id. § 220 (1).
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It is submitted that classing a servant as a type of agent makes
for an awkward use of language and can impede communication.
In order to separate the two classes for purposes of tort liability,
the Restatement first considers agents who are servants.'0 But then,
in order to consider the lesser tort liabilities of some principals, it
has to create a new class of "non-servant" agents." Since this latter
class is what in ordinary legal parlance is an "agent," the new
language of the Restatement only makes for semantic confusion.
It would seem to facilitate analysis of employment relation-
ships to distinguish one who is primarily a servant from one who
is primarily an agent. A useful definition of servant is the second
one of the Restatement 12 or the one in the California Civil Code,
which states: 13
A Servant is one who is employed to render personal service to
his employer, other than in the pursuit of an independent calling,
and who in such service remains entirely under the control and
direction of the employer, who is called the master.
The master-servant relationship is a bilateral one in which the
servant engages in physical or mental work for the master, subject
to the supervision of the master.14 A servant's employment centers
on his assigned task, and any contact with third parties is merely
incidental. Thus the driver of the delivery truck may hand over
goods to consignees and the junior dentist employed on salary by
his senior may work on patients, but both are legally servants.3
The right to control, and not necessarily the exercise of that
right, is the test of the relation of master and servant, and the
right is not over merely what is to be done but also over how it is
to be done.16 Although it is said that determinative test is the
10 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
11 Id. §§ 250-251.
12 See note 9 supra.
13 WEST CAL. LABOR CODE § 3000 (West 1955), formerly CAL. Civ. CODE§ 2009 (1872). This definition is taken from the CIrVI CODE OF NEW
YORK § 1034 (1865).
14 Rendleman v. Niagara Sprayer Co., 16 F.2d 122, 124 (E.D. Ill. 1925).
15 Wightman v. Wightman, 223 Mass. 398, 111 N.E. 881, (1916). See Brown
v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3rd Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957);
Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1947).
16 The existence of the right to control may be inferred from a combina-
tion of factors which usually varies according to the circumstances of
each case .... Thus, highly skilled cooks or gardeners who resent and
even contract against interference are normally servants when regu-
larly employed. The fact that a particular occupation may involve
such technical skill that the employer is wholly incapable of super-
vising the details of performance does not preclude a master and
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS
complete right of the master to control the physical method of the
servant, the presumptions of the law work in the opposite direction.
The view of most courts is that if an employee is hired to do physical
tasks and there is not clear evidence that the party who is hired
is in business for himself as an independent contractor, then he is
a servant. Once the employee is held to be a servant, the employer
is presumed to exercise control of the physical details of his assigned
tasks.17 One must conclude that the prime behavioral characteristic
of a servant is a "legal presumption" that he has no discretion in
choosing the physical method of performing his service.
The comprehensive liability of the master for the torts of his
servant both in England and in the United States, as described in
"committed while acting in the course of employment," is largely
based on the right and power of the master to control the physical
activities of the servant, which implies an assumption of risk of
loss from injuries arising out of those activities.I s Since the master
is presumed to control the details of the servant's physical method,
he is held liable for the torts that occur in or arise out of its execu-
tion. Furthermore, the presumption is conclusive, not rebuttable.
Even though the master grants the servant wide discretion in the
choice of physical method or even forbids certain physical methods,
he is still presumed to control.19 So long as the servant acts to
servant status .... Although the work may inherently require exten-
sive freedom of action, such freedom does not preclude a finding of
the master's essential right to control.... One may be a servant though
far away from the master, or though so much more skilled than the
master that actual direction and control would be folly, since it is the
right to control rather than the exercise of control that is the test of the
relationship of master and servant. (citations omitted) Frankle v.
Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 48, 47 N.W.2d 482, 487 (1951). See Pauley v.
Kenaldo Ltd., [1953] 1 All. E.R. 226, 228; Cameron v. Nystrom, [1893]
A.C. 308, 312.
17 "In general, control will be implied by law if the activity of the
employee at the time bears such a connection to the business of the
employer as will permit the conclusion that responsibility for the
employee's conduct in such a situation is fairly included within the
risk of doing business assumed by the employer." Cobb v. United
States, 247 F. Supp. 505, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1965). See Leidy, Salesmen As
Independent Contractors, 28 MIcH. L. REv. 365, 377-78 (1930).
I8 See United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914, 916-17 (4th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied. 339 U.S. 903 (1950); Cesare v. Cole, 418 Pa. 173, 210 A.2d
491, 494 (1965); F. MEcHiEM, OUTiHS OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 246-78
(4th ed. 1952); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of
Risk, 38 YAL.E L. J. 584, 720 (1929).
19 See Lindemuth v. Steffy, 173 Pa. Super. 509, 511, 98 A.2d 242, 244
(1953), for an example of a servant who has been delegated discretion
to chose his physical method. As to acts forbidden by the master, see
United States v. Taylor, 236 F. 2d 649, 654 (6th Cir. 1956); Montgomery
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further the execution of his assigned tasks, he will be held to be
in the controlled course of his employment, with the rare exceptions
of his choice of patently unreasonable modes or instrumentalities.
The principal-agent relationship is a much more particular
employment concept than the master-servant for anyone using
common legal parlance, as opposed to the language of the Restate-
ment. Agency may be defined as the consensual relationship in
which one party, the principal, appoints a second party, the agent,
to act in his behalf in a representative capacity, primarily to make
contracts between the principal and third party.20 Thus the key
feature of the agency relationship is that it is at least trilateral.21
The principal employs an agent to go into the marketplace and deal
for him with third parties. The primary purpose is to make con-
tracts between the principal and third parties through the negotia-
tions of the agent. Some particular classes of agents, however, such
as real estate brokers, merely execute preliminary negotiations
and do not enter contracts for their principals. In any case, the
distinguishing characteristic of the agent's tasks is communication
with third parties in an effort to make contracts and not the physical
activity characteristic of most servants.
Although a principal may retain the right to control the details
of the agent's conduct with respect to matters entrusted to him,
there is no presumption he will do so. In fact, most agents are
delegated discretion to devise the best method of effecting contracts
for their principals within the scope of their delegated authority.22
In many cases, agents are hired because they have skills in nego-
tiating purchases or sales which their principals do not have. Fur-
thermore, the agent's power to make contracts for his principal in
excess of his delegated authority, the apparent authority problem,
v. Hutchins, 118 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1941); Barnes v. Mitchell, 341
Mich. 7, 9, 67 N.W.2d 208, 210 (1954); Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lock-
hart, [1942] A.C. 591; 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 230 (1957).
20 See S. B. McMaster, Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F.2d 469, 474
(E. D. S. C. 1925); Brutinel v. Nygren, 17 Ariz. 491, 492, 154 P. 1042,
1044 (1916); CAL. Civ. CODE § 2295 (1872); CIVIL CODE OF NEW YORK
§ 1216 (1865). Mecham adopts esentially the same definition, citing
numerous authorities. 1 F. MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY 13-14 (2d ed.
1914).
21 See Dingle v. Hare, 7 C.B. (N.S.) 145, 159, 141 Eng. Rep. 770, 776
(1859); Abbot, The Nature of Agency, 9 HARV. L. REv. 507, 512 (1896).
22 S. B. McMaster Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F.2d 469, 474 (E. D. S. C.
1925); Store of Happiness v. Carmona & Allen, 152 Cal. App. 2d 266,
269, 312 P.2d 1104, 1107 (1957); Pariente v. Lubbock, 8 De.G.M.&G.
5, 44 Eng. Rep. 290, 293 (1855); Wolff v. Horncastle, 1 Bos. & Pul.
316, 126 Eng. Rep. 924, 928 (1798). See comment of Holmes in 2 KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AmEmiCAN LAW 260 n. (12th ed. 1884).
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clearly illustrates the degree to which the agent has independence
of action. The early explanation of agency as the fictional identifica-
tion of action by the agent as that of the principal gives no recog-
nition to the fact that the key issues of agency law center on the
discretion vested in agents and their misuse of it. 23
In addition to the differing tort liabilities of masters and prin-
cipals, which will be examined in the final sections of this paper,
the key reason for determining if an employee is basically a servant
or an agent is concerned with what presumptions third parties may
legally make about the employee's power to contract for his em-
ployer, the apparent authority problem. If the employee is an agent,
his primary function is to make contracts for his principal. Third
parties, having been informed by the principal that the employee
is his agent, may presume the employee has the same authority
as other agents in that line of business. But third parties should
never presume that an employee who is basically a servant has
general agency authority. 4 When a clerk or other servant is given
possession of goods or documents of title, his wrongful "sale" or
"pledge" of the goods or documents will not transfer title from his
master to innocent third parties..2 5 In contrast, a mercantile agent
in possession of a principal's goods can, in violation of the principal's
direction, transfer title to innocent third parties..
2 6
The distinction between the principal-agent relationship and
the master-servant relationship has also been held decisive in a
few other situations. In certain instances, statutes are applicable
either to servants or to agents, and a court cannot determine liability
in those cases without first determining which type of employee is
concerned.2 7 Under many employment contracts, a principal is free
to discharge his agent with little or no notice, while a master is
usually bound to give due notice to his servants.
2 8
23 Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 350 (1891), reprinted in 0. W.
HoLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 49, 57-58 (1920).
24 East Coast Freight Lines v. Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 58 A.2d 290, (1948);
Moore v. Tickle, 14 N.C. 266 (1831).
25 Heymen v. Flewker, 13 C.B. (N..S.) 519, 143 Eng. Rep. 205 (1863);
Lamb v. Attenborough, 1B.&S. 831, 121 Eng. Rep. 922 (1862); Lowther
v. Harris [1927] 1 K.B. 393; Farquharson Bros. & Co. v. King & Co.,
[1902] A.C. 325.
26 Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 758 (1812); Whitehead v.
Tuckett, 15 East 400, 104 Eng. Rep. 896 (1812), illustrating common-law
rule. See FACTORS ACT, 1889 (52 & 53 Vic. c. 45).
27 Merriman v. Thomas, 103 Va. 24, 48 S.E. 490 (1904); Regina v. Negus,
L.R.2C.C.R. 34 (1873); Regina v. Walker, Dears & Bell 600, 169 Eng.
Rep. 1136 (1858); Baillie v. Goodwin & Co., 33 Ch. D. 604 (1886).
See 1 F. MacHE, LAw OF AGENCY 24, n.19 (2d ed. 1914).
28 Bauman v. Hulton Press Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 1121; Hudon v. Cool,
42 Que S.C. 228 (1912).
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Although the basic character of an employee as servant, agent,
or independent contractor must be determined before one can
assess the legal effects of the employee's attempts to contract for
the employer, this does not mean a servant or independent con-
tractor can never be given any agency authority. Many employees
who are basically servants are delegated special limited agency
authority. A retail shop assistant (sales clerk), for example, is
basically a servant empowered to show his master's goods to pros-
pective customers. Yet, this servant, who does not have general
agency power to negotiate price or terms of trade, does have limited
agency power to finalize a contract by handing the customer his
purchase and taking his money. An independent contractor can
also be given limited or special agency power. Brokers and factors
combine the characteristics of agents and independent contractors.
A building contractor usually receives the full price for delivering
a completed building, but the purchaser could in unusual circum-
stances appoint the contractor a special agent to make the purchaser
liable to material suppliers. This might happen if the contractor's
credit standing was impaired and he was unable to buy the
materials to complete the building. Another example is the inde-
pendent contractor who is in two businesses at once, warehousing
and brokerage. As to goods entrusted to him for sale he has agency
power, but as to goods entrusted to him solely for warehousing he
does not have agency power.29
II. PRINCIPAL'S VICARIOUS LIABILITY
FOR AGENT'S TORTS
The liability of a principal for the torts of his agent is not as
broad as the liability of a master for the torts of his servants. If the
agent has also the characteristics of an independent contractor in
that he holds himself out as an independent enterpriser who repre-
sents more than one principal, the principal is not liable even if
a physical tort arises directly out of the agent's transaction of the
business of the agency. Thus one who employs a broker, factor,30
attorney,3' or collection agency 32 is not responsible for physical
torts committed by these agents in the execution of the agency. This
rule is stated in Section 250 of the Restatement (second) of Agency
as follows:
29 Cole v. North Western Bank, L.R. 10 C.P. 354 (1875).
30 See American Flexible Conduit Co. v. State Tax Commission, 345
Mass. 146, 186 N.E. 2d 445, (1962), on the nature of an industrial
factor.
31 Pyle v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 179 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1950).
32 Calvert v. Atlanta Hub Co., 37 Ga. App. 295, 139 S.E. 917 (1927).
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A principal is not liable for physical harm caused by the negli-
gent physical conduct of a non-servant agent during the perform-
ance of the principal's business, if he neither intended nor author-
ized the result nor the manner of performance, unless he was under
a duty to have the act performed with due care."
Where the agents are full-time or regular employees, such as
sales or purchasing agents, the rules for the principals' liabilities in
tort are more complex. The basic presumption of most courts is
the same as stated above for agents who are also independent con-
tractors. But the principal incurs vicarious liability for the physical
torts of his full-time agent if:
(1) The principal has actually controlled the physical method of
the agent, expressly or impliedly, in which case the master-servant
course-of-employment rule applies, OR
(2) Even though the principal has not controlled the agent's physical
method, the tort is committed in the transaction of the business of
the agency with the third party.
These two possible grounds of liability must be considered
separately.
A. AC UAL CONTROL oF PHYsiCAL METHOD
The first possible ground of principal's liability, actual control
of the agent's physical method, results in the application of the
broad course-of-employment rule. This general rule for the master's
liability for servant's torts is applied to principals only when they
actually control their agent's physical methods. The principal, in
contrast to the master, is not presumed always to control the mode,
manner and details of his agent's physical activity because the agent
is not employed primarily to do physical tasks. If physical activity,
such as getting to the third party's place of business, is necessary,
it is merely incidental to an agent's primary function of negotiating
contracts. The principal may leave this choice of physical method
entirely to the discretion of the agent. So long as the principal does
not exercise actual control, expressly or impliedly, of the agent's
incidental physical activities, he is not liable for torts arising there-
from, even though they obviously occur in the course of the agent's
employment. As to this incidental physical activity, the agent is
comparable to an independent contractor.3 4
If the principal does actually control the agent's choice or means
of locomotion, then he assumes the risks arising therefrom; he is
33 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 250 (1957).
84 McCrady v. National Starch Products, 41 Del. 392, 23 A.2d 108 (1941).
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liable for the agent's negligence because, by controlling the means,
he is presumed also to control the details of the employee's method
of executing his tasks, as in the case of master and servant. If the
principal supplies the vehicle, it is reasonably inferred that he has
chosen the means of transport. 35 In Singer Manufacturing Co. v.
Rahn,36 the principal supplied the sales agent with a wagon and
the agent furnished the horse and harness. The contract of employ-
ment gave the principal general power to prescribe and regulate
the details of the agent's activities, including routing and driving.
The principal was held liable for negligent driving by the agent
within the course of his employment.
When the agent uses his own car, determination that the prin-
cipal has actually controlled the agent's choice of transport and
therefore his physical method is more difficult. If it is a condition
of employment that the agent supply and use his own automobile
to reach third parties, the principal has clearly directed the choice
of physical method.37 In other cases, actual control of means or
method by the principal is inferred from the fact that the agent is
reimbursed by the principal for his automobile expenses or from
the fact that it is customary in that trade and expected by principals
that agents will use automobiles.38 But in a greater number of
cases imposing liability on the principal, the courts revert to the
classical language, describing an agent as a type of or equivalent
to a servant.3 9 In these cases, if the agent is not proved to be a dis-
tinct independent contractor, then he is held an employee or servant.
Treating him this way, the courts apply the usual rule for servants
that the mere right to control physical method, and not actual
35 Emond v. Wertheimer Cattle Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 389, 397, 153 N.E.2d
870, 877-78 (1958).
36 132 U.S. 518 (1889).
37 Peterson v. Brinn & Jensen Co., 134 Neb. 909, 280 N.W. 171 (1938);
Kohl v. Albert Lifson & Sons, 128 N.J.L. 373, 25 A.2d 925 (1942); Goz-
donovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23, 53 A.2d 73 (1947).
33 Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 289, 290, 16 N.E.2d
447, 449 (1938); Sinclair v. Perma-Maid Co., 345 Pa. 280, 283, 26 A.2d
924, 926 (1942); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 179
Tenn. 29, 34, 162 S.W.2d 501, 506-07 (1942).
39 Feinsinger v. Bard, 195 F.2d 45, 48-49, (7th Cir. 1952); Lawrence v.
Vail, 166 F. .Supp. 777 (D.S.D. 1958); Graetch v. Dix, 68 Cal. App. 2d
115, 156 P.2d 79 (1945); Hynes v. Donaldson, 155 Colo. 456, 395 P.2d
221 (1964); King v. Ransburg, 111 Ind. App. 523, 39 N.E. 2d 822 (1942);
Boland v. Morrill, 270 Minn. 86, 132 N.W.2d 711, 715 (1965); Cooke v.
Drigant, 289 N.Y. 313, 45 N.E.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1942); Pressley v.
Turner, 249 N.C. 102, 105 S.E.2d 289 (1958); Bready v. Tipton, 407
P.2d 194, 204 (Okla. 1965); Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d
44, 49-52 (1954)). See Annot., 36 A. L. R. 2d 265-69 (1954) on insur-
ance agents as servants.
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control, is sufficient for liability of the master. In these cases,
whether the agent is a servant or an independent contractor is a
jury question and is based on weighing certain key criteria.40 In
many of these courts, however, the paramount issue of the degree
of control reserved by the principal is side-stepped by merely label-
ing the agent a servant and then adopting the presumption of con-
trol which is found in most master-servant tort cases.
In England and in a large group of American states, the
distinction between agent and servant is maintained. Absent proof
of actual control of method, the principal is not liable for the agent's
physical torts. In these jurisdictions, if the traveling sales agent
uses his own car, chooses his own route and is paid by comnmission,
the usual inference is that the principal has exercised no control
over the agent's means of locomotion. The principal is therefore
not liable to an injured party for the agent's negligent driving
enroute to call on a customer even though the agent is clearly in
the course of his employmert. In the leading English case of this
type, Egginton v. Reader,41 a principal was held not liable to a
plaintiff injured by his agent, and was held not to have controlled
the agent's means of transport even though he knew the agent
would use his own car and the principal paid the agent £1 per week
in addition to his commissions for upkeep of the car. The American
decisions were reviewed in the leading cases of Stockwell v. Morris
42
and American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denke,43 and the majority adopt the
same rule as the Egginton case.
In some of the cases, absence of control by the principal is
demonstrated by the agent's freedom to choose any means of trans-
port, such as bus, train or taxi.44 But in most of the cases the evi-
dence is clear that the automobile is the only efficient means of
40 "... (1) the degree of control exercised by the employer, or the inde-
pendence enjoyed by the contractor or agent; (2) whether the party
is to be paid by the job or is to receive a certain salary by the day,
week or month; (3) whether his employment consists solely in work-
ing for his employer; (4) the control that is exercised over him in
method and manner of performing work; (5) whether the agent uses
his own equipment, or whether the equipment, if any, so used, is
owned and controlled by the owner; and (6) the nature of the con-
tract, whether written or oral." Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Gay,
365 P.2d 149, 151 (Okla. 1961).
41 [1936] 1 All E.R. 7. See Kiley v. Garnsey, 84 Sol. J. 274 (1940).
42 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933).
43 128 Tex. 229, 95 S.W.2d 370 (1936). See Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho
415, 431 242 P.2d 971, 982 (1952).
44 Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1960); Romero v. Shelton, 70
N. M. 425, 374 P.2d 301 (1962); Gittelman v. Hoover Co., 337 Pa. 242, 10
A.2d 411 (1940).
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travel, so that the agent can maximize the time spent in his pri-
mary function of negotiating contracts with third parties. In this
majority of cases, the courts emphasize that though the principal
has knowledge and consents to the agent using his own car, the
principal reserves no right to control the physical method of the
agent in handling the car.45 As noted in a leading case under Massa-
chusetts law: 46
It is the normal presumption that the right to control as to the
detailed operation of the car is an incident of proprietorship; and
to render the general employer liable on the doctrine of respondeat
superior there must be some evidence warranting that the owner,
while permissively using his own car on company business, has
yielded up to his employer this right to control speed, route and
the other details of operation.
In elucidating the agent's freedom from control, some of the
courts emphasize the agent's authority to choose his own hours of
work, his travel route and his methods of selling. But these factors
are not really significant to the issue of liability for physical torts.
The crucial presumption is that the agent is not subject to the prin-
cipal's supervision over the state of repair of the agent's car and
over what is a safe manner of operating the car. The agent is even
free to borrow his wife's car or a friend's car rather than use his
own on any particular business day.47 So long as the principal
leaves the agent completely free to make these choices, the prin-
cipal is not liable for physical torts. In fact, some courts confuse
the issue by labeling such a full-time agent an independent con-
tractor even though he clearly does not meet the criteria for the
generally accepted definition of a contractor.48
45 Cooke v. E. F. Drew & Co., 319 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1963); McCrady
v. National Starch Products, 41 Del. 392, 23 A.2d 108 (1941); Hayward
v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 430, 242 P.2d 971, 981 (1952); McDonald v. Dodge,
231 Iowa 325, 1 N.W.2d 280 (1941); Shedd Brown Mfg. Co. v. Tichenor,
257 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953); Henkelman v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 180 Md. 591, 26 A.2d 418, (1942); Gladney v. Holland Fur-
nace Co., 336 Mass. 366, 145 N.E.2d 694 (1957); Glynn v. M.F.A. Mutual
Ins. Co., 363 Mo. 896, 254 S.W.2d 623 (1953); Hutchins v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 89 N.H. 79, 192 A. 498 (1937); American Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Denke, 128 Tex. 229, 335, 95 S.W.2d 370, 376 (1936).
46 Conversions and Surveys, Inc. v. Roach, 204 F.2d 499, 501 (1st Cir.
1953).
47 American Say. Life Inc. Co. v. Riplinger, 249 Ky. 8, 9, 60 S.W.2d.
115, 116 (Ct. App. 1933); Henkelmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
180 Md. 591, 26 A.2d 418, (1942); American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Denke,
128 Tex. 229, 95 S.W.2d 370 (1936).
48 Fuller v. Lindenbaum, 29 Cal. App. 2d 227, 84 P.2d 155 (1938);
McDonald v. Dodge, 231 Iowa 325, 1 N.W.2d 280 (1941); Atlas Life
Ins. Co. of Tulsa v. Foraker, 196 Old. 389, 165 P.2d 323 (1946); Dunne
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B. COMMITTED IN THE TRANSACTION OF THE BusiNEss OF THE AGENCY
Even though the principal has neither reserved the right to
control nor exercised any actual control of the agent's physical
method, so that the course-of-employment rule would not apply,
the principal is still liable for torts of the agent committed in the
transaction of the business of the agency.49 Transaction of business
in this context can only mean the dealing of the agent with third
parties in order to enter or to execute contracts within the scope
of the agent's authority. If a physical tort by the agent arises out
of these negotiations, the principal will be held liable and control
of method is not an issue. Judge Lumbard suggests this liability
is a basic principle of agency which applies even though the doc-
trine of respondeat superior is excluded because it is held appplic-
able only to the master-servant relationship.50 A common example
is the intentional tort of battery. An agent negotiates to buy or
sell for his principal and the negotiations lead to an argument about
the product or service in question. When the controversy ends in
assault by the agent on the third party, the principal is held liable.51
But he will not be liable if the assault takes place because, after
the transaction is completed, the third party tells the agent he will
report him to his employer. 2 In those cases where sale of the
principal's product requires physical demonstration of it, torts re-
sulting from the demonstration clearly arise from the transaction of
the business of the agency. A car salesman who negligently failed to
make certain the transmision was not in gear before pushing the
linkage of an idling car which lurched forward injuring the cus-
tomer for whom it was being demonstrated commits a tort for
which his principal is liable.53 And if a car salesman negligently
permits a prospective customer who is an inexperienced driver to
v. Contenti, 256 App. Div. 833, 9 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 1939); Igna-
towitch v. McLaughlin, 66 N.D. 132, 262 N.W. 352 (1935); Bond v.
Harrell, 13 Wis. 2d 369, 108 N.W.2d 552 (1961).
40 This language is found in CAL. ClV. CODE § 2338 (1872), as borrowed
from the CivuL CODE OF NEw YORK § 1253 (1865). In spite of the
clear difference in English usage, the California Courts have held
"transaction of the business of the agency" to be equivalent to "course
of employment". In this way, they have extended a statute particu-
larly designed to deal only with the tort liabilities of principals to
codify also the tort liabilities of masters. See Tighe v. Ad Chong,
44 Cal. App. 2d 164, 166, 112 P.2d 20, 22 (1941).
50 De Ronde v. Gaytime Shops, 239 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1957).
51 Stansell v. Safeway Stores, 44 Cal. App. 2d 822, 113 P.2d 264 (1941).
See Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963);
Skow v. Steele, 74 S.D. 81, 49 N.W.2d 24 (1951).
52 Warren v. Henlys, Ltd. [1948] 2 All E.R. 935 (K. B.).
53 Williams v. Andresen, 63 Wash. 2d 645, 388 P.2d 725 (1964).
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drive the car, the principal will be liable for injuries to property
and persons resulting from the driving.54 In these cases, the agent
is not using the car as a mere incident to the business, but rather
he is using it for the very transaction of the business of the agency.
This second basis of principal's liability applies to many torts
in addition to the physical ones already discussed. Conversion is a
prime example. When a ship's master makes an unnecessary sale
of damaged cargo, the owners of the ship will be liable to the con-
signee for the value of the goods.5  Likewise, when goods are in the
possession of a bailee under an option to purchase and the bailee
notifies the bailor it does not intend to exercise the option and has
no further use for the chattels, it is conversion for the managing
agent of the bailee to refuse to deliver them up, for which his prin-
cipal is liable.56 A principal will also be liable for false imprison-
ment if his agent has authority to cause the arrest of persons in the
protection of the principal's property.57 If an employee is suspected
of misappropriating funds or a customer of shoplifting, the manag-
ing agent of the business may detain the suspect for questioning
and commit the tort of false imprisonment. 58 Since the detention is
committed as part of the management of the business, it can be
said to occur in the transaction of the business of the agency. A
similar rule applies to an action for malicious prosecution 59 and
for defamation ° against principals whose agents committed these
wrongs while doing acts within the scope of their authorities.
The general rule has been applied to tortious acts of many
types arising out of agents' transactions. A real estate broker, for
example, was held liable for the negligence of his agent in over-
valuing a price of property which was taken in trade by a customer
of the broker."' And a labor union was held liable for the torts of
54 Kelly v. Lowney & Williams, 113 Mont. 385, 126 P.2d 486 (1942).
55 Tronson v. Dent, 8 Moo. P.C. 419, 14 Eng. Rep. 159 (1853).
56 Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 5 N.J. 28, 73 A.2d 905 (1950).
See Miller v. Long, 126 Ind. App. 482, 131 N.E.2d 348 (1956).
57 Turner v. Mellon, 41 Cal.2d 45, 257 P.2d 15 (1953); Bank of New South
Wales v. Owston, 4 App. Cas. 270 (1879).
58 Peak v. Grant, 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1964); Dillon v. Sears-Roebuck
Co., 126 Neb. 357, 253 N.W. 331 (1934).
59 Hornin v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 120 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1941); Clark
v. Andrews, 109 Cal. App. 2d 193, 240 P.2d 330 (1952); Manuel v.
Cassada, 190 Va. 906, 59 S.E.2d 47 (1950). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 253 (1957).
60 De Ronde v. Gaytime Shops, 239 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957). See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 254 (1957).
61 Fredrick v. Squillante, 144 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1962).
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its business agent in inducing breach of contract.6 2 Another recent
example concerns the rental agent who, in violation of a rent con-
trol law, demands an illegal premium from prospective tenants
before renting them a flat. In Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd.,63 the
premium was held recoverable by the tenant from the landlord
even though agent's taking of the premium was a crime. So long
as the tenants did not know the agent intended to pocket the pre-
mium as his own, the illegal act clearly in excess of the agent's
authority arose out of the transaction of the business of the agency.
III. PRINCIPAL'S VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR
AGENT'S MISREPRESENTATIONS
The principal's vicarious liability for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions of his agents is reviewed separately not only because of the
close relation to innocent misrepresentation, which is not a tort,
but also because of the special determining effect of this tort on
contract. Furthermore, the principal's liability when the agent acts
from private motives differs in fraud cases as compared to physical
torts.
The general rule for vicarious liability of principals for agent's
fraudulent misrepresentations is the second one stated in the pre-
vious section. The principal is liable if the fraud is committed by
the agent in the transaction of the business of the agency. If the
principal has conferred actual or apparent authority upon agent to
make representations of fact to third parties concerning the subject
matter of the agency, the principal will be liable for fraudulent
misrepresentations committed in negotiating such a transaction.64
But the rule is even broader. The Restatement asserts that even if
principal has done no act to confer actual or apparent authority
upon the agent to make representations of fact, he will be liable for
fraudulent misrepresentations of the agent if it is usual for persons
in that trade to make representations.5 Thus it is argued that even
the undisclosed principal will be held liable for the fraud of his
agent who has been told to make no representations if it is reason-
62 Howard v. Haven, 198 Tenn. 572, 281 S.W.2d 480 (1955).
63 [1951] 2 T.L.R. 674. See United States v. Waters, 194 F.2d 866 (7th
Cir. 1952).
64 Ralston Purina Co. v. Novak, 111 F.2d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 1940); Groen-
ing v. Opsata, 323 Mich. 73, 34 N.W.2d 560 (1948); Stewart v. Potter,
44 N.M. 460, 465, 104 P.2d 736, 739 (1940); Bachman v. Monte, 326 Pa.
289, 295, 192 A. 485, 487 (1937). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY
§§ 257(c), 258 (1957).
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 258 (1957), comment a. at 560.
See Horack, Vicarious Liability For Fraud And Deceit In Iowa, 16
IOWA L. REv. 361, 371 (1931).
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able in that trade for the third person to rely on the representation.
The argument is strongest when the agent has received money or
other assets from the third party in reliance upon the fraud and
has paid over or transmitted these assets to the undisclosed prin-
cipal.
The general rule was confirmed in English law in Barwick v.
English Joint Stock Bank.66 The managing agent of defendant bank,
in an effort to collect a debt for his principal, fraudulently induced
the plaintiff to extend further credit to the debtor. In holding the
bank liable for its agent's fraud, the court rejected the earlier view
of some English courts that a principal was liable only if he auth-
orized or ratified such fraud.67 It held the principal liable for such
wrong "as is committed in the course of the service and for the
master's benefit, though no express command or privity of the
master be proved."68 The condition that the agent act for his prin-
cipal's benefit if the principal is to be held for fraud is no longer
law. It had developed most clearly in cases concerning bills of
lading. I n Grant v. Norway,69 for example, the master of a ship
as part of a conspiracy to borrow money for his own benefit, fraudu-
lently issued a bill of lading though no goods had been delivered
to him. His principal was held not liable for this fraud even though
the agent had actual authority to issue bills of lading, because it
was outside the scope of the agent's authority to issue a bill of lading
for his private benefit when no goods were received. Thus, in this
action upon the case, the court emphasized the contract concept
of authority and used it to limit the principal's liability in tort.
Although Grant v. Norway has not been specifically overruled
in England, the courts have rejected the limitation that the prin-
cipal has vicarious liability for fraud only when the agent acts for
principal's benefit. The leading case is Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.70
The conveyancing manager of defendant, a firm of solicitors, fraudu-
lently induced the plaintiff, a widow who came to the firm for
advice, to convey two cottages and a mortgage to him personally.
The manager then mortgaged the two cottages and called in the
other mortgage, both for his own benefit. The House of Lords held
defendant vicariously liable on the general ground that the agent
committed fraud while purporting to transact the type of business
in which he was authorized. The rule relating to physical torts
66 L.R. 2 Ex. 259 (1867). See Hern v. Nichols, Holt, K. B. 462, 1 Salk 289,
91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1701).
67 See Udell v. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172, 158 Eng. Rep. 437 (1861).
68 L.R. 2 Ex. 259, 265.
69 10 C.B. 665, 138 Eng. Rep. 263 (1851). See Coleman v. Riches, 16 C.B.
104, 139 Eng. Rep. 695 (1855).
70 [1912) A.C. 716.
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that the agent must be actuated at least in part by a purpose to
serve the principal was rejected here. An attempt to limit this
rule to cases in which the plaintiff was defendant's client was
rejected in Uxbridge Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Pick-
ard.71 The managing clerk of defendant solicitors forged a deed
and obtained a loan of £500 upon a mortgage of the property to
plaintiff. Since the ostensible authority of such clerks included
obtaining loans, the principal was held liable for fraud committed
while the agent was transacting business within such authority.
The court specifically rejected any analogy to a servant who was
off on a frolic of his own and also rejected the contention that fraud
by forgery was different from other fraud committed while trans-
acting business within an agent's ostensible authority. This broad
rule of vicarious liability can now be said to have general applica-
tion whether the principal is a person or corporation.7 2
Those American courts which in the last century had concurred
with Grant v. Norway in exempting the principal from liability
when the agent committed fraud for his own benefit have also
rejected this limitation.73 The leading modern case is Gleason v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry74 The freight agent of defendant railroad in
charge of bills of lading falsely informed plaintiff cotton factor that
certain goods had arrived; he then forged a draft and a bill of lading
and presented it to plaintiff, who paid the $10,000 demand. The
agent executed the whole scheme for his own secret purpose and
benefit, and he absconded with the money. In reversing the court
below, which had held for the defendant because the agent had
acted solely for his own benefit, the Supreme Court said: 7 5
And we think that the restriction of the vicarious liability of
the principal adopted by the court below is supported no more by
reason than by authority. Undoubtedly formal logic may find
something to criticize in a rule which fastens on the principal
liability for the acts of his agent, done without the principal's
knowledge or consent and to which his own negligence has not
contributed. But few doctrines of the law are more firmly estab-
lished or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy
than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own.
The breadth of the rule in American courts is summarized in
Section 261 of the Restatement: "A principal who puts a servant or
71 [1939] 2 K.B. 248.
72 See Briess v. Woolley, [1954] A.C. 333.
73 See Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U.S. 7 (1881); Friendlander v. Texas & Pac.
Ry., 130 U.S. 416 (1889) for prior law.
74 278 U.S. 349 (1929). See Hanover Nat. Bank v. American Dock &
Trust Co., 148 N.Y. 612, 43, N.E. 72 (1896); Bank of Batavia v. New
York, L.E. & W.R. Co., 106 N.Y. 195, 12 N.E. 433 (1887); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 262 (1957).
75 278 U.S. at 356.
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other agent in a position which enables the agent, while apparently
acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon third persons
is subject to liability to such third persons for the fraud."7 Kean v.
National City Bank77 is typical of a large group of cases where
bank officers use their business affiliation to induce the reliance
of third parties in a fraudulent scheme solely for their own personal
gain. In this case, the vice-president of a bank, knowing negotiable
bonds to be stolen, as part of a fraudulent scheme sold them in
the bank's name. Although the bank had no material connection
with the transaction other than the wrongful use of its name, it
was held liable for the fraud of its agent because his position enabled
him to execute the scheme. Similarly, in Rutherford v. Rideout
Bank7" where successive bank managers had undertaken to give
financial advice to an inexperienced woman depositor and mort-
gagor, a confidential relation existed between her and the bank.
When the manager of the bank fraudulently advised her to sell a
ranch at a low price to a secret friend of the manager with whom
he was sharing the proceeds of the scheme, the bank was liable for
fraud even though it was not generally in the business of giving
investment advice and received no gain from the transaction. The
cases rest on the reasonable inference of third parties that the
agent is acting for his principal in the transaction. If a reasonable
man should not make the inference in the particular circumstances,
then the principal will not be liable for the fraud.79
The equitable remedies of a third party who is induced to enter
a contract by fraud of an agent are even greater than those at
common law. This is illustrated by that small class of agents who
have neither actual nor apparent authority to make representations
concerning the subject matter of the agency. In the United States,
this is particularly true of most real estate agents, who merely
bring buyers and sellers together but do not enter contracts or even
negotiate price or terms of trade. If such an agent has no authority
to make any representations, his principal will not be vicariously
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 (1957).
77 294 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1923), petition for cert. dismissed, 263 U.S. 729
(1923). See Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of New York v. Plants-
ville Nat. Bank, 158 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1946); National City Bank v.
Carter, 14 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1926); Stewart v. Wright, 147 F. 321 (8th
Cir. 1906), cert. denied 203 U.S. 590 (1906).
78 11 Cal.2d 479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938). See McCarthy v. Brecton Bank, 314
Mass. 318, 50 N.E.2d 196 (1943); Greenough v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 96 Vt.
47, 117 A. 332 (1922).
79 Steunenberg v. National Progressive Life Ins. Co., 138 Neb. 240, 292
N.W. 737 (1940); Mattice v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States, 270 Wis. 504, 71 N.W.2d 262 (1955).
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liable in tort for the agent's fraudulent misrepresentations. 0 Never-
theless, though the third party will not have an affirmative action
in fraud in such a situation, if he relied on the misrepresentations
in good faith, he will still be allowed to rescind the contract. 81
The principal will not be allowed to benefit from his agent's fraud
concerning a material aspect of the transaction even though repre-
sentations are outside the scope of the agent's authority. Third
parties who do not often buy real estate and who are unfamiliar
with the unusually narrow apparent authority of real estate agents
are allowed rescission, since it would be unreasonable to expect
them to investigate the extent of such authority.
A. EXcULPATORY CLAUSES
Clauses in written contracts expressly limiting the representa-
tions to the document and disclaiming other representations of
negotiating agents or clauses exempting principals from liability
for fraud of agents are common in the United States. In the English
reports, however, there appears to be only one case, on appeal from
Ireland, S. Pearson & Son, Ltd. v. Dublin Corp.8 2 The exculpatory
clause did not purport to exempt the principal from fraud, but
merely stipulated that the third party must satisfy himself con-
cerning all facts of existing structures and the principal did not
hold itself responsible for the accuracy of information supplied by
it. The House of Lords held that this clause contemplated honesty
on both sides and did not purport to exempt defendant from liability
for the deliberate fraud of its agents. In dictum, Lord Loreburn
indicated it might be possible for a principal to exempt himself from
liability for fraud of his agents by an express contractual clause
to that effect.8
In the United States, even though it is against public policy
for a principal to contract out of liability for his own fraud, as to
liability for fraud of his agent, most courts follow Section 260 of
the Restatement. 4 As summarized there, a principal may validly
80 Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., 33 Ariz. 101, 261 P. 969 (1928).
See note, 1 U. Cm. L. REV. 137 (1933); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 111 (1928).
81 Thrams v. Block, 43 N.M. 117, 86 P.2d 938 (1938); Lindlots Realty Corp.
v. County of Suffolk, 278 N.Y. 45, 15 N.E.2d 393 (1938); Littler v.
Dunbar, 365 Pa. 277, 74 A.2d 650 (1950). Where the purchaser's agent
committed the unauthorized representation, the purchaser would be
denied specific performance. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co.
v. White, 361 Mo. 1111, 238 S.W.2d 368 (1951). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 259 (1957).
82 [1907] A.C. 351.
83 Id. at 354.
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260 (1957).
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contract to relieve himself of vicarious liability in tort for fraud
of his agent, but when such a contract is induced by fraudulent mis-
representations of the agent, it is still subject to rescission by the
third party. The rule is applied whether the exculpatory clause
merely states that all representations are limited to those in the
written contract 8 5 or the clause specifically attempts to exempt the
principal both from actions of deceit and rescission. 6
The rationale of the American view, which allows rescission in
spite of the exculpatory clause, is the paramount rule that even an
innocent principal will not be allowed to benefit from his agent's
fraud concerning a material aspect of the transaction. As in the
case of the agent without any authority to make representations,
the contract is voidable though the statements are clearly outside
the scope of the agent's actual authority. The clauses are thus not
taken at face value. The third party, however, must prove that he
has overlooked the exculpatory clause, which is usually in a printed
form contract supplied by the principal, in order to demonstrate
that he has relied on a material misrepresentation of the agent. If
he carries this burden of proof, the third party is not estopped from
claiming he was misled. Estoppel is fundamentally an equitable
doctrine founded on good conscience and fair dealing, usually for
the purpose of preventing fraud and injustice. Consequently, a
principal will not be allowed to interpose estoppel on the third
party in order to take advantage of his agent's frauds 7
In a few cases, the exculpatory clause is given full effect and
the defrauded party will not even be allowed to rescind the con-
s8 Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 31 N.E.2d 551 (1941), in effect over-
ruling the older rule which gave full force to exculpatory clauses in
Colonial Development Corp. v. Bragdon, 219 Mass. 170, 106 N.E. 633(1914). See Owen v. Schwartz, 177 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Aber-
crombie v. Martin & Hoyt Co., 227 Ala. 510, 150 So. 497 (1933);
Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal.2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945); Utilities Engi-
neering Institute v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981 (1943); Robinson
v. Main, 227 Iowa 1195, 290 N.W. 539 (1940); Gloeser v. Moore, 284
Mich. 106, 278 N.W. 781 (1938); National Equipment Corp v. Volden,
190 Minn. 596, 252 N.W. 444 (1934); Tams v. Abrams, Ramos & Co.,
120 N.J.Eq. 253, 185 A. 521 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); Angerosa v. White
Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N.Y.S. 204 (4th Dep't 1936), aff'd 275 N.Y.
524, 11 N.E.2d 325 (1937); Miller v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 178
Okl. 313, 62 P.2d 975 (1936). In a few states, a principal may be liable
in tort despite the exculpatory clause. Hali v. Crow, 240 Iowa 81,
34 N.W.2d 195 (1948); Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co.,
268 Wis. 455, 67 N.W.2d 853 (1955).
86 California Mut. Co. v. Voigt, 5 Cal. App. 2d 204, 42 P.2d 353 (1935);
Speck v. Wylie, 1 Cal.2d 625, 36 P.2d 618 (1934).
87 Angerosa v. White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 433-34 290 N.Y.S. 204, 216
(4th Dep't 1936), aff'd 275 N.Y. 524, 11 N.E.2d 325 (1937).
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tract.88 But in these cases the courts have found that either the
third party had read the exculpatory clause and therefore could
not reasonably rely on the agent's oral misrepresentations, or he
had failed to exercise care in not reading the form contract he
signed. In the latter group of cases, the courts have had to weigh
the claims of an innocent principal against those of a negligent
third party, and they have given decision for the principal.
B. NEGLIGENT M.ISREPRESENTATIONS OF AGENT
A principal's liability for misrepresentations of his agent which
are negligent but not fraudulent and which result only in pecuniary
loss but not physical injury to the third party raises many complex
issues. Until 1963, the English courts did not recognize an action
for such a negligent misrepresentation at all,8 9 so that the issue of
a principal's possible vicarious liability did not arise. The decision
of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners
Ltd.9 0 appears to go a long way toward overruling the earlier Eng-
lish view. The plaintiff, an advertising agency, before extending
substantial credit to a customer, asked its bank to inquire of defend-
ant merchant bankers concerning the financial status of the cus-
tomer. One of the partners of defendant, knowing that the state-
ments would be relied on by firms dealing with the customer, negli-
gently reported the customer to be in good financial standing. The
response carried the disclaimer, "For your private use and without
responsibility on the part of the bank or its officials." When the
customer failed and plaintiff brought this action for damages, the
trial court held that there were negligent misstatements, but on
the authorities defendant was not liable. On appeal, the dismissal
of the action was affirmed on the basis of the disclaimer of respon-
sibility in the defendant's response to the credit inquiry. Neverthe-
less, the opinions of the Law Lords centered on the issue that a
duty of care could exist in the making of representations resulting
in pecuniary loss, a cause of action separate and distinct from fraud
or from any equitable rights of rescission. In their opinions, they
expressly disapproved the earlier authorities which had denied such
a cause of action. Although vicarious liability was not put in issue
88 Holland Furnace Co. v. Williams, 179 Kan. 321, 295 P.2d 672 (1956);
Mesce v. Automobile Ass'n of New Jersey, 8 N.J. Super. 130, 73 A.2d
5886 (App. Div. 1950); Ernst Iron Works v. Duralith Corp., 270 N.Y.
165, 200 N.E. 683 (1936).
89 Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491; Candler v..Crane, Christmas &
Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164; Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
90 [1964] A.C. 465. See Goodhart, Liability for Negligent Misstatements,
78 L. Q. REv. 107 (1962); Stevens, Hedley Byrne v. Heller: Judicial
Creativity And Doctrinal Possibility, 27 MODERN L. REV. 121 (1964).
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in the case, since a bank was being sued for the misstatements of a
partner, possible liability of a principal was clearly presumed in the
appeals opinions. The decision would seem to open the way for
later English courts to impose a new and larger vicarious liability
on principals for representations of agents.
In the United States, there is general liability for negligent
misrepresentations to a person who is in privity of contract with
the defendant, but most courts refuse to extend this liability to
other third parties."' However, if the negligent statement is made
by one purporting to have special knowledge of or competence in
the subject matter and if it is made directly to the plaintiff or to
someone who can reasonably be expected to transmit it to the
plaintiff, defendant will be liable though there is no privity of con-
tract. Thus a public weigher 92 or public accountant 93 will be liable
for their negligent reports or financial statements to third parties
who are not in privity but who can be expected to rely on the repre-
sentations. Prosser suggests that even though the liability is not
as wide as that for fraud, that there is a rational basis for an
extensive liability for negligent misrepresentations. 4 This is surely
true when a bank or accountant is reporting on the financial status
of a client to those who will extend credit.9 5 It would be an onerous
burden to expect such a third person who relied on the misstatement
to prove either fraud or gross negligence which is equivalent to
fraud.
Given these general principles of liability, it can be assumed
they would also be applied in holding a principal liable for his
agent's negligent misrepresentations. Eamoe v. Big Bear Land &
Water Co.96 is an example of such liability where there was privity
of contract between plaintiff and defendant. The agent of the land
company negligently showed plaintiff building lots other than
described in the contract of sale to him and told him he could
proceed with building if he desired. Upon discovery of the error,
the plaintiff chose to affirm the purchase of the described lots and
sue for the damages he incurred by having built on land he did
not own. In spite of both the absence of fraud and a broad exculpa-
91 The leading authority is Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N.E. 441 (1931).
92 Glanzer v. Shephard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
93 Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 132 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd
285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1955). See State Street
Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1938).
94 W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw oF TORTs 719-24 (3rd ed. 1964).
95 See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 184 (1953); cf. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324 (1957).
96 98 Cal. App. 2d 370, 220 P.2d 408 (1950).
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tory clause limiting the representations of those in the written
contract, plaintiff was allowed the affirmative action for damages.
C. INNOCENT ISREPRESENTATIONS OF AGENT
A principal who with fraudulent intent transmits his misrepre-
sentations to third parties through an innocent agent is of course
liable for fraud.9 7 This liability of the principal in tort is not vicar-
ious, but direct. The agent is a mere channel, comparable to a
telephone or the mails. If the principal not only knows that appar-
ent facts of the subject matter are untrue, but has a fraudulent
intent to withhold or conceal this information from his agent, he
will be liable for fraud though the agent's misrepresentation is
innocent. Hence, a principal who consciously permitted his agent
to remain ignorant of material facts in order to prevent disclosure
should the third party inquire about them was liable for fraud.9 8
An innocent principal was held vicariously liable when an inno-
cent agent transmitted information to a third party which he
obtained from a second agent of the principal who had the fraudu-
lent intent and knew the information was to be forwarded to third
parties. 99 Here all the elements of fraud were in the second agent.
In a similar situation, a corporate principal was held liable for fraud
when its agents fraudulently assembled plans, drawings and speci-
fications which the principal, innocent of the details, forwarded to
third parties.10 0
It is essential, however, for an action in tort for fraud that all
the elements of fraud be found in one person. In the agency situa-
tion, this means that the misrepresentation of material fact and
the knowledge of falsity be found either in the principal or the
agent but not divided between them. In Armstrong v. Strain,'10
the owner of a bungalow employed a real estate agent to sell it. The
agent made certain innocent misrepresentations concerning the
property; the owner, who did not know such representations were
97 Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639 (1935); Cerriglio v. Pettit,
113 Va. 533, 75 S.E. 303 (1912). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 256(1) (1957).
98 Bumpas v. Stein, 18 Idaho 578, 111 P. 127 (1910); Dargue v. Chaput, 166
Neb. 69, 81, 88 N.W.2d 148, 156 (1958); Ludgater v. Love, 44 L.T. 694
(1881). See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 256(1) (1957).
99 London County Freehold and Leasehold Properties, Ltd. v. Berkeley
Property and Investment Co., [1936] 2 All E.R. 1039 (Ct. App.),
1046-47, (Slesser, J.).
100 Pearson & Son, Ltd. v. Dublin Corp., [1907] A.C. 351.
101 [1952] 1 K.B. 232. See Gibson v. Cottingham, 32 D.L.R. 213 (1916);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 256(2) (1957).
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to be made by the agent, did know facts which rendered them
untrue but had no fraudulent intent to conceal these facts. Since
there was a division of the elements of fraud between the principal
and agent, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment for
defendants. "[Y]ou cannot add an innocent state of mind to an
innocent state of mind and get as a result a dishonest state of
mind."'1 0 2 This case follows e doctrine of Cornfoot v. Fowke,0 3
in which a third party's defense of fraud to a breach of contract
action was denied where an agent to lease a house innocently said
there was nothing objectionable about it, while his principal knew
that there was a brothel next door.
Even though there can be no affirmative action for fraud when
the ingredients of deceit are innocently divided, may the third party
rescind the contract by refusing to perform because it was induced
by the agent's innocent misrepresentation? The early English deci-
sion of Cornfoot v. Fowke104 said no, if the principal sued at com-
mon law for money damages. The subsequent decision of Mulens
v. Miller'°5 makes it clear that innocent misrepresentation by an
agent is a good defense for the third party against a principal's
action in equity for specific performance. Since the Judicature Act
of 1873,106 a defendant in England may set up an equitable defense
in any court, common law or equity. The House of Lords has
affirmed the general application of this rule, 01 so that the decision
denying the defense of innocent misrepresentation in Cormfoot v.
Fowke is not valid law today. In the United States, innocent mis-
representation of material facts is generally a good defense to an
action for breach of contract at common law or in equity,0 8 and this
defense is available to a third party induced to enter contracts by
the innocent misrepresentations of an agent.10 9
102 Armstrong v. Strain, [1951] 1 T.L.R. 856, 872, (Devlin, J.). See Devlin,
Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Division of Responsibility Between
Principal and Agent, 53 L. Q. REv. 344 (1937); 15 MODERN L. REv. 232
(1952).
103 6 M. & W. 358, 151 Eng. Rep. 450 (1840).
104 Id.
105 22 Ch.D. 194 (1882).
106 Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, §§ 24(1),
24(2), and 25(11). See W. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGous LAW
OF CONTRACT 201-08 (21st ed. A. Guest 1959).
107 Newbigging v. Adam, 34 Ch.D. 582 (1886), aff'd 13 App. Cas. 308 (1888).
See Long v. Lloyd [1958] 2 All E.R. (Ct. App.) 402; Leaf v. Interna-
tional Galleries, [1950] 2 K.B. 86; Harrison v. Knowles & Foster, [1918]
1 K.B. 608; G. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 234-40 (1962).
108 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476 (1957).
109 Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 189 F.2d 913, 917
(2d Cir. 1951); Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N.Y. 375, 118 N.E. 855 (1918);




The Restatement (second) of Agency attempts to merge the
rules for vicarious liability of principals and masters for physical
torts of employees into a single body of law. It is submitted that
the effect is to confuse many lawyers and judges and create the
misapprehension that there are no rational and reasonable distinc-
tions between agents and servants in the legal impact of their phys-
ical torts. In fact, the contrary conclusion is apparent from the
Restatment's definition of servant and the usual presumptions of
the English and American courts which have met the issues. In
the master-servant relationship, the master is presumed to control
the details of the servant's physical method of executing his assigned
tasks and is therefore held liable for torts committed in the course
of the servant's employment. In the principal-agent relationship,
there is no such presumption of control by the principal. If there
is actual control of the agent's physical method by the principal,
then the course-of-employment rule can be applied. But this key
issue of the existence or amount of control by the principal is many
times slighted or overlooked by courts following the Restatement's
view that an agent is a type of servant. Furthermore, there is
another group of situations in which a principal may be liable for
his agent's physical torts even though he has exercised no control
of physical method. This is when the tort is committed in the trans-
action of the business of the agency of the third party and is at least
in part motivated to serve the principal.
As to the principal's liability for his agent's misrepresentations,
the course-of-employment rule from the law of servants' physical
torts has no application, since fraud is not physical. Here again,
many courts become confused and try to apply master-servant law.
It is clear, however, that liability of a principal for fraud of his agent
is peculiar to the law of agency. A principal is liable for his agent's
fraud if it is committed in the transaction of the business of the
agency so that it is reasonable for the third party to believe that
agent is transacting his principal's business. It is now established
law in both England and the United States that the principal can
be liable for fraud even though the agent commits the tort solely
for his private motive and profit. Here again the rule for fraud
differs from that for physical torts.
In the areas of both physical and verbal torts, the law in Eng-
land and in the United States is very similar, though the confusion
of servants and agents occurs in both countries. Even in the area
of liability for negligent misrepresentations, the House of Lords
has recently imposed liability on a basis comparable to that in
American courts. It is submitted that a codification of the basic
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rules of agency would obviate many of the problems created by the
failure of courts to understand the unique and special characteristics
of agents as compared to other employees. Just as the Uniform
Commercial Code has resolved many controversies in the law of
sales, negotiable instruments and security devices, so codification
could clear up many of the confusing issues of the law of agency.
